DOMESTIC SECURITY, CIVIL CONTINGENCIES
AND RESILIENCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

A Guide to Policy

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June 2007

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am especially grateful to David Livingstone, Tony Baptiste and others for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper, and to the compilers of *Homeland Security and Resilience in the United Kingdom*, published by Chatham House in January 2005. Any remaining errors of fact or judgement are, of course, my responsibility.

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June 2007
Section 1

INTRODUCTION

Background: Strategic Terrorism

The international security landscape has been altered radically in less than a decade. Al Qaeda’s attack on the United States in September 2001, together with other terrorist outrages in Bali, Madrid, London and elsewhere, and extensive military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, have all combined to form the impression of a world undergoing a period of profound and often painful change, without a very clear indication as to where and when it might all end. In this uncertain climate, governments around the world have responded by seeking to identify, and then to mitigate challenges to domestic stability and security. To a limited extent, the national security response has been a matter of revisiting the Cold War practice of ‘national defence’ (a mixture of ‘civil defence’ and ‘military home defence’), the object of which was to prepare for a major attack on cities and facilities, and to be able to manage the consequences of such an attack for domestic society and government.

Yet there are important distinctions to be drawn between the Cold War and the international security environment of the early twenty-first century. The first and most obvious difference is that the threat of massively destructive industrial warfare, on an unprecedented and possibly terminal scale, is no longer the central planning assumption.¹ Instead, the security picture is dominated by a more generalised but lower scale threat from terrorism: ‘generalised’ because the threat of violence might come from a broader range of sources than during the Cold War; and ‘lower scale’ because, traditionally, a terrorist attack is not an all-out armed assault but is a more nuanced campaign directed at the mind and confidence of the public and of the political classes.

Terrorism is now the core strategic concern. In part, this is a function of the supposed absence of any greater threat such as that perceived during the Cold War. In other words, terrorism has expanded to fill the security policy vacuum because it is largely unrivalled and unchallenged as a strategic threat. But the problem of contemporary terrorism is more than a matter simply of its relative importance. Terrorism has always been either a means to some strategic end – a form of violent negotiation intended to achieve, as with Irish republican terrorism, a withdrawal from contested territory – or an expression of violent ideological opposition (to capitalism, for example, as with the German Baader Meinhof Group/Red Army Faction). Twenty-first century terrorism, however, appears to offer a disturbing combination of both motives. By some accounts, the goal of anti-Western terrorism is as strategic and purposive as terrorism has ever been: to remove Western presence and influence from the Islamic world; to defeat secularist, modernising and democratising tendencies within Moslem countries; and possibly even to bring about the collapse of the Western, liberal democratic, secular idea altogether. But for other perpetrators of terrorism, it is as if the attack is an end in itself. More than merely a negotiating ploy, terrorism has for many become an act of personal martyrdom or violent redemption, driven by some eschatological vision of struggle and conflict. Furthermore, these various grievances increasingly receive instant and world-wide coverage on the news and electronic media, with the result that what might previously have been a local or national issue, might now become a reason for globalised dispute and protest. The world-wide web has, arguably, become an

¹ The possibility of major war has not, however, been dropped entirely, at least in UK defence planning circles; see Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, The DCDC Global Strategic Trends Programme 2007-2036 (London: Ministry of Defence, third edition, January 2007), p. 67.
important device for the radicalisation of impressionable potential terrorists, with images of alleged injustices posted by unseen, unknowable and unaccountable proponents of violent struggle.

From the perspective of security policy-makers and practitioners, as a strategic threat terrorism must appear no less purposive than in the past, and probably a good deal more pervasive. Early twenty-first century terrorism has rightly become a strategic-level concern because of the structural vulnerability of Western societies to terrorist attack on all levels, because ‘asymmetric warfare’ is often understood better by adversaries than by their intended victims, and because of the profusion of means – including chemical, biological, radiological and even nuclear weapons and technologies – with which to mount a series of high-visibility terrorist attacks. If these are among the distinctive features of the predominant strategic concern of the early twenty-first century, a policy and operational response is required which acknowledges the complexity and interconnectedness of the contemporary strategic threat and which can adapt and evolve as circumstances change. Yet while terrorism has become the central strategic concern, it remains what it has always been – an attack on public perceptions, confidence and trust in government. For this reason, the ‘top-down’ policy and operational response must also meet a third requirement for ‘bottom-up’ involvement of local and community organisations and even individuals in meeting the threat, in a ‘big tent’ approach to the national counter-terrorism response. Of course, local agencies and political organisations have always made a vital contribution to the response to terrorism. But with the advent of strategic terrorism, the work of local agencies is recognised as an indispensable component of the centrally directed, strategic response. This shift in the relative importance of local preparedness is acknowledged by a change in the official language of domestic security policy and planning in the United Kingdom; ‘civil defence’ has given way to ‘civil contingencies’ and ‘resilience’. This new terminology encompasses very well the stylistic changes that are necessary in preparing for and responding to terrorist threats in the early twenty-first century. As yet, however, the participation of the wider public in the design and delivery of the national anti-terrorism strategy is ad hoc and incoherent.

**Aim and Structure of this Report**

The purpose of this report is to account for recent developments in domestic security policy, planning and preparation in the United Kingdom. The report is organised in three substantive sections:

- Section 2: Threats to Domestic Security. The processes by which threats to the security of the United Kingdom are identified.
- Section 3: Central Government. The concepts, machinery and the approach of central government to security threats.
- Section 4: Non-Central Government and Other Government Agencies. The role of non-central government agencies and other organisations.

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3 Asymmetric warfare can usefully be understood as the war of the weak, but clever and determined, against the strong but complacent.

4 The availability to terrorists of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and technologies is explored in P. Cornish, *The CBRN System: Assessing the Threat of Terrorist Use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Weapons in the United Kingdom* (London: Chatham House, 2007).
The report concludes with an Annex setting out the United Kingdom’s Lead Government Department system for civil contingencies and resilience.

This report updates a previous document published by Chatham House in 2005, entitled Homeland Security and Resilience in the United Kingdom. As with the 2005 document, much of the information used to compile the present report is freely available in open sources and on the web-sites of the various Government agencies concerned. While the report goes into some detail as far as regional and local arrangements are concerned – consistent with the perception that domestic security policy must be an efficient combination of the ‘top-down’ and the ‘bottom-up’ – London is the focus of interest at the non-central government level. With its almost totemic status as a western capital city, and with its concentration of population, key infrastructure and national and international business activity, the need to ensure the security of London is closely reflected in the allocation of planning effort, resources and personnel by Government agencies.
Section 2

THREATS TO DOMESTIC SECURITY

The Security Service (MI5) and Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure

The UK Security Service (often known as MI5\(^5\)) is responsible for identifying, and protecting the UK homeland against threats to national security. Traditionally secretive, its primarily role has been to identify, investigate and disrupt the activities of hostile intelligence agencies and terrorist organisations on the territory of the United Kingdom.

With the passing of the Security Service Act 1996, MI5’s role has expanded to include providing support to law enforcement agencies in fighting serious crime. Additionally, in keeping with the broader Government approach, the Service has recently taken on a more ‘public-facing’ stance, offering online security advice and threat information on the Security Service web-site (www.mi5.gov.uk) which currently (May 2007) highlights the following key threats:

- There is a serious and sustained threat from international terrorism to the UK and UK interests overseas. Since 14\(^{th}\) August 2006 the threat level in the UK has been assessed as ‘Severe’.

- The most significant terrorist threat comes from Al Qaeda and associated networks. Information on Al Qaeda’s typical methods of attack and targets and the current threat to the UK has been prepared by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), a cross-departmental body created in June 2003 to analyse intelligence relating to international terrorism.

- Northern Ireland-related terrorism continues to pose a threat. Dissident republican terrorist groups, who have rejected the Good Friday Agreement of April 1998, still aspire to mount attacks in Great Britain. This assessment might change in the light of agreement on the reconstitution of the devolved Northern Ireland Assembly in May 2007.

- The spread, or proliferation, of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is another potential danger to the UK’s security. The Security Service has been involved in countering this threat since 1992.

- The threat from espionage against the UK did not end with the collapse of Soviet communism in the early 1990s. Several countries are actively seeking British information and material to advance their own military, technological, political and economic programmes.

Closely associated with the Security Service, the inter-departmental Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) advises Government and appropriate non-governmental agencies, as well as those sections of commerce and industry whose services and products form part of the Critical National Infrastructure (CNI). The Government views the CNI as those assets, services and systems that support the economic, political and social life of the UK whose importance is such that any entire or partial loss or compromise could:

\(^5\) The Security Service, known colloquially as MI5, is not to be confused with the Secret Intelligence Service – known as MI6. The United Kingdom’s national intelligence and security machinery is described in outline at www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/caboff/nim/0114301808.pdf
• cause large scale loss of life;
• have a serious impact on the national economy;
• have other grave social consequences for the community, or any substantial part of the community; or
• be of immediate concern to the national government.

The CPNI provides security advice in both the physical and the virtual domain. Organisationally, the CPNI arose from a merger, on 1st April 2007, of the National Security Advice Centre (NSAC – formerly a part of the Security Service) and the National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre (NISCC). NSAC had been responsible for providing advice on physical security and personnel security, while NISCC’s task had been to provide advice and information on computer network defence and information assurance. The amalgamation of the two bodies has had the effect of bringing cyber-terrorism into mainstream counter-terrorism policy, with the result that IT security policy can be developed in parallel with the previously predominant concern with physical security. A series of Parliamentary debates and Parliamentary questions, however, suggests there is more work to be done where security against cyber-terrorism is concerned.6

CPNI draws resources from various government departments and agencies, including the Security Service, the Communications Electronics Security Group (CESG - the UK’s national technical authority for information assurance), and government departments responsible for specific infrastructures (discussed below). The CPNI works closely with the private sector in the United Kingdom and with international partner organisations. Accountable to the Director General of the Security Service, the CPNI has a particularly close relationship with UK Police Forces; the police National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) is co-located with CPNI, and CPNI officials work closely with the police network of Counter Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSAs) co-ordinated by NaCTSO.

Counter-Terrorism

The driver for much of the Government’s planning for security and resilience is the threat posed by internationalised terrorism. The lead Government Department for counter-terrorism is the Home Office (and within the Department the lead for a terrorist incident is the Home Office Terrorism and Protection Unit (TPU)). It seems likely that the TPU will be reorganised or renamed as part of changes to the UK machinery of government announced in March 2007 (see below for further details and discussion of the new Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism).

The Home Secretary is responsible for the domestic security of the UK because he has direct responsibility for counter-terrorist policy and legislation, the police, and the security and intelligence work of the Security Service (MI5).

The Home Secretary also has a co-ordinating role: as chairman of the Cabinet committees on terrorism and related issues, he supervises all counter-terrorism work across Government, to bring together the supporting work of Ministers in other departments. Through these committees he also oversees work across Government on resilience and contingency planning. The main Committees he chairs are:

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6 A House of Lords debate on the effectiveness of the NISCC was sponsored by Lord Harris of Haringey on 9th December 2004: [http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldhansrd/vo041209/text/41209-22.html#41209-22_head2](http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldhansrd/vo041209/text/41209-22.html#41209-22_head2) There have been several Parliamentary Questions on cyber-terrorism since this point.
• **Ministerial Committee on Defence and Overseas Policy, Sub-Committee on Protective Security and Resilience (DOP (IT) (PSR))**, which oversees planning work in the medium term to strengthen defence against terrorism, and improve resilience and the management of the consequences of major emergencies;

• **Ministerial Committee on Civil Contingencies (CCC)**, which manages the Government’s response in times of crisis.

These committees are made up of Ministers from key government departments, as well as representatives from the relevant emergency services and the devolved administrations. The Home Secretary’s deputy is the Minister of State for counter-terrorism and resilience issues whose responsibilities also include crime reduction, policing and community safety.

The Government’s counter-terrorist strategy is set out publicly on the Home Office web-site at [http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism-strategy/](http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism-strategy/). The stated strategic aim is to reduce ‘the risk from international terrorism so that our people can go about their business freely and with confidence’. The programme to implement the UK counter-terrorism strategy is known as ‘CONTEST’, discussed in more detail below. CONTEST is divided into four areas of activity known as the ‘4 Ps’:

- **Prevent** terrorism by tackling the underlying causes of radicalisation in the UK and abroad, and by engaging in a ‘battle of ideas’ against those who project an extremist ideology;
- **Pursue** terrorists and those that sponsor them by gathering intelligence and disrupting terrorist activity, and by working with allies and partners internationally;
- **Protect** the public and UK interests by strengthening border security, improving the security of key utilities, and by protecting the public in ‘crowded places’; and
- **Prepare** for the consequences of a terrorist attack by developing the necessary means with which to respond to an attack, and by a process of testing and evaluating national preparedness.

The ‘Prevent’ and ‘Pursue’ strands are, in short, designed to pre-empt the threat of terrorism, whereas ‘Protect’ and ‘Prepare’ are intended to reduce the vulnerability of the public and infrastructure of the country to terrorist attacks and their consequences. The principal guidance on counter-terrorism is the Home Office Counter-Terrorism Planning Guidance which is a classified document. However, unclassified, publicly available explanations of aspects of government strategy can be found on the UK Resilience web-site, such as guidance for local authorities on the release of CBRN substances and materials. Information on other Home Office-led programmes is also available electronically, such as information on the use of science and technology to strengthen the United Kingdom’s ability to combat terrorism.

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7 See [http://www.ukresilience.info/emergencies/cbrn_docs/homeoffice/release/index.shtm](http://www.ukresilience.info/emergencies/cbrn_docs/homeoffice/release/index.shtm)
Section 3

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

UK Strategic Concepts: ‘Civil Contingency’ and ‘Resilience’

The key driver for change in UK domestic security policy has been the recent surge in international terrorism, most notoriously the attack on the United States on 11th September 2001. Driven by these events, the UK has been closely involved in US-led actions against international terrorism; the so-called ‘global war on terror’. It is important to note, however, that the United Kingdom’s domestic security system differs in several respects from the approach adopted by the United States:

- Terrorism is treated as a civil crime within the United Kingdom, rather than an act of war or insurgency. The UK’s participation in international counter-terrorism activity comes largely under the ‘Prevent’ and ‘Pursue’ strands of CONTEST (see above), and is concerned to challenge the bases for foreign extremists’ allegations and their recruitment practices, and to disrupt their operations.

- Following 9/11, the United States government took the decision to establish a Department of Homeland Security. The DHS came into being on 1st March 2003, bringing together some 22 government agencies and approximately 180,000 employees. There is no such body in the United Kingdom, although in late 2006 discussion began as to the merits of revising the machinery of government in the United Kingdom where security and counter-terrorism are concerned. The results of this discussion are set out below.

- The UK government’s preference, instead, has been to treat terrorism as one of a number of causes of emergency, which should be planned for and managed using a variable architecture of co-operation between central/regional and local government, and between the competent agencies.

The United Kingdom, like the United States, devotes considerable resources to reducing the vulnerability of society to terrorism. In the UK, this is done through the ‘Protect’ and ‘Prepare’ strands of CONTEST. The burden of action under the ‘Protect’ strand falls to the Home Office, and to the body within the Security Service responsible for providing security advice – the CPNI, discussed above.

Under the ‘Prepare’ strand, the United Kingdom’s preferred approach centres upon two concepts – ‘Civil Contingency’ and ‘Resilience’ – which are key to understanding both the current UK Government machinery and the manner in which other agencies are co-ordinated to meet severe disruptive challenge. Described in more detail below, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) of the UK Cabinet Office was established in 2001 in the wake of the Y2K bug scare, the Fuel Protests of 2000 and the Foot and Mouth epidemic of 2001 because it was felt that existing emergency management policies and structures were inadequate. After 9/11, the capabilities of the CCS were directed towards the mitigation of the consequences of major terrorist incidents, as well as other natural or man-made disasters. With its responsibility for the ‘Prepare’ strand of the UK strategy, the CCS is, as a result, unique within CONTEST in that it deals with both hazards and threats.

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The new approach was plainly required, one which could prepare for, manage and assist in the recovery from complex, ‘networked’, disruptive challenges, and which could provide improved horizon scanning in order to be better able to pre-empt security threats and risks. The term ‘resilience’ was chosen in order to indicate the need for a flexible, disseminated, infrastructure-wide capability to absorb disruption on a regular basis: distinct from and in addition to the reactive, occasionally convened, centrally controlled character of ‘emergency management’ and more traditional, security-intelligence agency-led activities. This policy approach underpins the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, described in more detail below.

In sum, the dissemination of the capability to absorb disasters means that, while Government agencies retain the lead, both the overall strategy and, as currently formulated, the Civil Contingencies Act, will distribute the responsibility for risk management and emergency response more widely than before (thereby potentially widening the market for commercial security organisations). In late 2004 this wider, ‘cross-sector’ approach to resilience and security was extended to encompass terrorism and electronic attack by the Director General of the Security Service (MI5).11

**Government Strategy**

In the wake of 9/11, the Government introduced a counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST)12 which includes both preventive measures focussed largely at stemming the risks at source, and the pursuit of terrorists, as well as a significant overhaul of security measures within the UK. These domestic security measures are designed to protect and prepare for the consequences of a terrorist attack. In addition to initiatives already referred to above, CONTEST has led to efforts to improve the resilience of critical systems, with the goal that these systems should be able to recover and rectify themselves, or at least rapidly to contain the consequences of disaster, whether the result of a terrorist attack or some other cause.

The organisational arrangements for handling crises, including the consequences of terrorist attack, in the United Kingdom are based on two principles. First, that the response to major emergencies should be primarily at the local level, with additional resources, as required, arriving from regional and then national levels as the scale of the incident becomes known;13 and second, that in each disaster there should be one ‘lead’ department responsible for coordinating the response of central government, backed up as necessary by the central Whitehall emergency machinery.

**Principal Legislation**

The legislative framework for civil domestic security, civil contingencies and resilience in the United Kingdom is provided by a series of terrorism-related laws as well as the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. The principal legislative measures are as follows:

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12 Within CONTEST, the elements of Prevention and Pursuit may include military operations against terrorist groups, using capabilities (in the areas of reconnaissance, surveillance, rapid deployment, target acquisition, precision strike and command, control and communications) developed for wider use in interventions overseas. The Protection and Preparation strands, which together constitute the main elements of the UK’s national resilience effort, are domestic measures where military structures will only have a supporting role, either ad hoc or through inter-departmental agreements.
13 This differs markedly from the ‘top down’ US approach, in which the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) takes a more instrumental role in disaster recovery, arguably at the expense of establishing communications and decision-making protocols between local responding organisations.
• **Terrorism Act 2000**
  The *Terrorism Act 2000* is the primary piece of UK counter-terrorist legislation. Key measures include:
  
  o Outlawing certain terrorist groups and making it illegal for them to operate in the UK;
  o Giving police enhanced powers to investigate terrorism;
  o Creating new criminal offences, including:
    ♦ Inciting terrorist acts;
    ♦ Seeking or providing training for terrorist purposes at home or overseas;
    ♦ Providing instruction or training in the use of firearms, explosives or chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.

• **Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001**
  The *Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001* (ATCSA) was passed in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, coming into force in December 2001. ATCSA addresses a broad range of issues, including:
  
  o Freezing terrorist property and funding;
  o The management within government of information required for counter terrorism;
  o The UK’s immigration and asylum procedures, and their possible exploitation by terrorists;
  o The security of the nuclear and aviation industries;
  o The security of ‘dangerous substances’ (such as pathogens and toxins) that might be attacked or used by terrorists;
  o UK legislation concerning chemical, nuclear and biological weapons;
  o The scope of police powers in the UK;
  o Investigatory powers and the retention of communications data;
  o The UK’s external obligations in police and judicial co-operation and anti-corruption initiatives.14

  Part 4 of ATCSA, which sought to prevent the exploitation by terrorists of the UK’s immigration and asylum procedures, aroused particular controversy. Critics were exercised by those provisions of ATCSA which enabled the UK Home Secretary to derogate from obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights on grounds of national security, to order the detention without trial of individuals suspected of planning or intending terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom and internationally, and other police and judicial measures. These provisions led to the UK government being accused of holding individuals unlawfully, merely on the grounds of their nationality.15 After some public discussion, Part 4 of ATCSA was debated in Parliament in early March 2003 and was renewed. ATCSA Part 4 was eventually replaced by a new system of control orders set out in the *Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005*.

• **Civil Contingencies Act 2004**
  The legislative framework for civil contingencies and resilience preparedness in the United Kingdom is provided principally by the *Civil Contingencies Act 2004* (CCA). CCA is in two

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15 As an illustration of this debate, see ‘Anti-terror law vital, court told’, *The Guardian*, 8th October 2002.
parts: Part 1 covers local arrangements for civil protection, while Part 2 covers emergency powers.

- **Civil Contingencies Act Part 1**
  CCA Part 1 establishes the roles and responsibilities for those involved in emergency preparation and response at the local level. The Act divides local responders into two categories, imposing a different set of duties on each. Category 1 organisations are those which would be at the core of the response to most emergencies (e.g. emergency services, local authorities, NHS bodies). Category 1 responders are subject to the full set of civil protection duties and will be required to undertake the following tasks:

  - Assess the risk of emergencies occurring and use this to inform contingency planning;
  - Put in place emergency plans;
  - Put in place business continuity management arrangements;
  - Put in place arrangements to make information available to the public about civil protection matters and maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public in the event of an emergency;
  - Share information with other local responders to enhance co-ordination;
  - Co-operate with other local responders to enhance co-ordination and efficiency; and
  - Provide advice and assistance to businesses and voluntary organisations about business continuity management (Local Authorities only).

Category 2 organisations are ‘co-operating bodies’, such as the Health and Safety Executive, transport and utility companies. These organisations are less likely to be involved in the heart of planning work but will be heavily involved in incidents that affect their sector. Category 2 responders do not have such a wide range of duties as those in Category 1, but are required to co-operate and share relevant information with other Category 1 and 2 responders. It should be noted that UK Armed Forces are not listed formally as either Category 1 or Category 2 responders.

Category 1 and 2 organisations will come together to form Local Resilience Forums (based on police areas) which will help co-ordination and co-operation between responders at the local level.

- **Civil Contingencies Act Part 2**
  Part 2 of the CCA updates the 1920 Emergency Powers Act, to reflect the developments in the intervening years and the current and future risk profile. It allows for the making of temporary special legislation (emergency regulations) to help deal with the most serious of emergencies. CCA Part 2 allows the UK government to declare a state of emergency (including on a regional basis) and make emergency regulations as judged necessary. The use of emergency powers is seen as a last resort option and planning arrangements at the local level should not assume that emergency powers will be made available. Emergency powers should only be invoked in exceptional circumstances, and their use is subject to a set of safeguards.

- **Terrorism Act 2006**
  The [Terrorism Act 2006](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/40) received Royal Assent in March 2006. Following the terrorist attacks in London in July 2005, consultations took place with law enforcement and intelligence agencies with a view to further improvements in planned developments to UK counter-
terrorism legislation. In the words of the Home Office website, the Terrorism Act 2006 is designed ‘to make it more difficult for extremists to abuse the freedoms we cherish, in order encourage others to commit terrorist acts.’ The Terrorism Act 2006 creates a number of new offences:

- **Acts Preparatory to Terrorism**
  Aiming to capture those planning serious acts of terrorism.

- **Encouragement to Terrorism**
  Making it a criminal offence directly or indirectly to incite or encourage others to commit acts of terrorism. This measure will include the ‘glorification of terrorism’; an expression which has aroused some controversy but which is understood by the drafters of the Act to mean ‘encouraging the emulation of terrorism.’

- **Dissemination of Terrorist Publications**
  This measure will cover the sale, loan, or other dissemination of terrorist publications, including those which encourage terrorism, and which provide assistance to terrorists.

- **Terrorist training offences**
  This measure makes it a criminal offence to give or receive training in terrorist techniques, or to attend at a place of terrorist training.

The Terrorism Act 2006 also makes amendments to existing legislation, including:

- The introduction of warrants to enable police to search any property owned or controlled by a terrorist suspect;
- The extension of ‘stop and search’ powers to cover bays and estuaries (coastal waters);
- The extension of police powers to detain suspects after arrest for up to 28 days (though periods of more than two days must be approved by a judicial authority);
- Improved search powers at ports; and
- Increased flexibility of the proscription regime, including the power to proscribe groups that glorify terrorism.

### Government Organisation and Plan for Resilience

- **The Lead Government Department (LGD) System**

In the event of a national security emergency, the role and contribution of the various departments and agencies of the UK government will be governed by the character of the crisis and the scale of the risks involved. The UK government resilience website describes the Lead Government Department system (LGD), by which the responsibility for responding to an emergency will be assumed by the most appropriate government agency. Generally, the LGD for a specific set of contingencies would be that which has day-to-day policy oversight of the sector(s) of the national infrastructure that would be most affected in a given type of emergency. Where an emergency occurs that does not permit straightforward LGD categorisation, then it will be the responsibility of the Head of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat to make a recommendation on the most appropriate LGD. The LGD lists and responsibilities are also reproduced and updated as necessary on the UK government resilience website, which explains which government department or authority

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17 Or where appropriate, a Devolved Administration department, in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland

18 For the list of potential contingencies and their default LGDs see Annex I.
will assume the lead in the event of a given emergency. A nominated LGD will also be required to incorporate assurance on contingency and capability planning within the annual assurance and risk control mechanisms being developed within the Central Government corporate governance regime.

The LGD response system is designed around three broad ‘levels of engagement’:

- **Level 1** – where the Lead Department/Minister runs the crisis response from their premises using their own emergency facilities as appropriate. CCS advises as and where necessary.

- **Level 2** – where the crisis response is co-ordinated from the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR) by the LGD. Terrorism always starts at this level with Home Office in the lead, whilst Defence and Overseas Secretariat in the Cabinet Office (ODSec) are responsible for the activation of COBR and, if required, the crisis facilities in the News Co-ordination Centre.

- **Level 3** – COBR/Civil Contingencies Committee (CCC): the Prime Minister or nominated Secretary of State leads in the event of a catastrophic incident requiring the involvement of Central Government from the outset to deliver an effective response, or where Emergency Powers are invoked.

Where an emergency is considered too broad or complex to be handled by a single department, or where the responsibility for leadership in a given crisis is not apparent from the government’s list of LGDs, the default response is as follows:

- In the United Kingdom as a whole, the Cabinet Office’s Civil Contingencies Secretariat will take the immediate lead and ensure that the appropriate department is then confirmed as the LGD. In case of doubt, it is the task of the CCS to confirm the LGD as promptly as possible. Where the incident is threatened or caused by terrorism, the initial phase will be led by the Home Office Terrorism and Protection Unit, and under new arrangements by the OSCT.

- In Scotland, the Scottish Executive Justice Department (SEJD) will initiate the Scottish Executive Emergency Action Team, acting much as the CCS.

- In Wales the HR (Facilities and Emergencies) Division of the Welsh Assembly Government (WAG) will take the immediate lead for any matters which are devolved and in which the lead role needs to be confirmed.

- And finally, in Northern Ireland the Central Emergency Planning Unit (CEPU) of the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister will provide advice on lead allocation.

- **Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS).**

Within central government, responsibility for resilience lies with the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS). Established in July 2001 and located within the Cabinet Office, the goal of the CCS is to improve the UK’s preparedness and response to

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emergencies (arising from threats or hazards, or both), and the resilience of central, regional and local government. The CCS thus has specific responsibilities for emergency planning and for assessing, anticipating and preventing future crises. The CCS acts as a policy catalyst, seeking to encourage and facilitate progress on the part of all government departments involved in responding to emergencies. The CCS reports to the Prime Minister through the Cabinet Office’s Permanent Secretary for Intelligence, Security and Resilience, currently (March 2007) Sir Richard Mottram. The CCS publishes up-to-date information and guidance on the UK Resilience website, including the non-statutory guidance paper*Emergency Response and Recovery*, first published in September 2005. The Permanent Secretary for Intelligence, Security and Resilience also has responsibility for the Single Intelligence Account, which funds the intelligence and security agencies.

The CCS has three main elements:

- **Near Term Planning and Crisis Management.** For the near term, the CCS has six specialist desks covering the full range of potential disruptive challenges:
  - Social Stability and Continuity of Government
  - Communication and Media
  - Economic and Financial Affairs
  - Transport, Energy and Distribution
  - Public and Animal Health and Food Safety
  - Environment and Water

  Officials liaise with other government departments with overlapping responsibility, particularly on predictive, ‘horizon scanning’ analysis: the product of which is passed on the Domestic Horizon Scanning Committee (DHSC) for approval and subsequent distribution to ministers and senior officials as the basis for planning and decision-making. For terrorist incidents, the CCS focuses on wider impact management and recovery issues, complementing the predictive work of the Security Service, police and Home Office OSCT, replacing the Terrorism and Protection Unit (TPU).

- **Medium Term Planning.** Where medium term planning is concerned, the CCS conducts systematic identification and assessment of the risk of serious disruption to everyday life (both threats [i.e. from terrorism] and hazards [i.e. a natural disaster]) over the coming five years. This assessment process in turn drives a Capabilities Programme which provides the main framework for resilience building across the UK. Seven categories of Capabilities are defined:
  - Plans (both generic and specific to particular risks);
  - Infrastructure;
  - Legislation;
  - Personnel;
  - Equipment;
  - Training; and

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21 See [http://www.ukresilience.info/](http://www.ukresilience.info/)
23 See [http://www.intelligence.gov.uk/overview/funding.asp](http://www.intelligence.gov.uk/overview/funding.asp)
The goal of the Capabilities Programme is to identify and quantify the capability needed in each category, and to support investment decisions. The Programme comprises 18 ‘workstreams’ (the original 17 were supplemented by a new workstream addressing the needs of victims and their families), grouped under three headings:

♦ Structural workstreams. Three workstreams dealing with national, regional and local response capabilities;
♦ Essential services workstreams. Five workstreams dealing with resilience in the food, water, fuel, transport, health, and financial services sectors.
♦ Functional workstreams. Nine workstreams intended to provide against the consequences of CBRN attacks, and for handling of infectious diseases (human and non-human), mass casualties, mass fatalities, mass evacuation, site clearance, warning and informing the public, and humanitarian assistance.

This process, known as the Resilience Capability Framework, is cyclical and generates an evaluation of current readiness states for the highest risks, i.e. those which combine a high probability of occurrence with a probably high impact.

♦ Training. The CCS also conducts training at its Emergency Planning College, at Easingwold near York, which provides multi agency doctrine and training in support of UK resilience.24

- Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG)

The Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) is the lead government department for developing resilience capabilities at regional level.25 DCLG is also responsible for developing policies, legislation and programmes for the Fire and Rescue Service. Through the New Dimension Programme introduced after 9/11,26 the UK Fire and Rescue Service has invested heavily in improving its capability to respond to major incidents in Britain in fulfillment of its responsibilities under the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004. Other responsibilities of DCLG include:

♦ Regional Resilience Oversight. The DCLG’s Regional Co-ordination Unit ensures continuity of planning in the nine regions of England, ensuring exercises are undertaken to rehearse for possible disasters and ensure that all agencies are strategically co-coordinated and, where possible, interoperable.

♦ Fire and Rescue Service Equipment. This includes initiatives to allow for mass decontamination and urban search and rescue, and means for dealing with more traditional civil emergency such as flooding and structural collapse. The Firelink project seeks to enhance command, control and communications systems.27 Alongside Firelink is the Regional Fire Control Project known as FiReControl; a national network of nine amalgamated regional control rooms for the Fire and Rescue Service which is intended

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24 See http://www.epcollege.gov.uk
26 See http://www.communities.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1123766
to improve the ability to respond to major terrorist incidents and other large-scale incident.28

- **Resilience Research.** The Civil Resilience Directorate (CRD), part of the Research Development Group within DCLG, also funds and oversees Resilience Research in support of civil resilience policy. CRD sponsors scientific and technical research in a range of areas, including IT-based contingency planning, personal protective equipment, hazard prediction and CBRN decontamination.

- **Ministry of Defence**

In the United Kingdom, preparation and planning for civil contingencies and resilience do not encompass the military defence of the UK, which is the responsibility of the *Ministry of Defence* and the Armed Forces (Royal Navy, Army and Royal Air Force). Civil contingencies and resilience are, instead, considered to be matters principally for the Home Office, the police and other emergency services (such as fire and rescue and ambulance).

However, following 9/11 the Ministry of Defence reviewed its contribution to national security in the form of a ‘New Chapter’ to be added to the 1998 Strategic Defence Review. The New Chapter, published in July 2002 made provision for a significantly enhanced role for the Armed Forces in the management of civil contingencies.29 Under the New Chapter, the UK Reserve Forces would be expected to provide a number of battalion-sized Reaction Forces (each of about 500 troops) for home defence and security purposes.

Further detail on the Reserve Forces proposal is provided in a Ministry of Defence document entitled *Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience*, published in December 2004.30 Under these new arrangements, the United Kingdom’s Reserve Forces are now organised to be able to provide 14 Civil Contingency Reaction Forces (CCRF), at varying degrees of readiness. These units, drawn from existing Territorial Army units, have some dedicated civil contingencies personnel and will generally be in a position to provide support to a local civil emergency response. The level of response cannot always be guaranteed, however, as some reservists may be supplementing regular forces in deployed operations, such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq. Military units might also be expected to provide surveillance and communications capabilities to complement the established command and control system. Following a call-out order for members of the Reserve Force, the tasks to be undertaken by CCRFs could include access control and key point guarding, assistance with mass casualties and the movement of displaced people, site search and clearance, the provision of water and feeding points, and command and control, and other tasks where there might be a requirement for uniformed and disciplined formations. The CCRFs would also be equipped with nuclear, biological and chemical personal protection equipment, enabling them to operate temporarily and to a limited extent in CBRN danger areas.31

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31 MoD. Operations in the UK, pp. 2F-1–2F-3.
Operations in the UK also outlines the constitutional arrangements by which the United Kingdom’s Armed Forces might become involved in civil emergencies. This has long been a delicate issue in British history, reflecting a certain squeamishness at the prospect of armed troops being seen on the streets of mainland Britain. The Ministry of Defence publication is suitably cautious on this point: ‘The defence contribution to resilience is important, but it is also essential that it is not seen as the sole, or even the major, contributor to the resilience of the UK as a whole.’ If armed forces were to be drawn into a civil emergency, central government would unavoidably become involved in the handling of the emergency, since defence and the deployment of armed force is the exclusive responsibility of central government. There is an elaborate policy framework governing military involvement in civil contingencies, known as Military Aid to Civil Authorities (MACA). MACA comprises Military Aid to other Government Departments (MAGD), Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP) and Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC). Military forces could also become involved under the rubric Military Operations (MO) in the United Kingdom, including the security of Defence Key Points and the work of the Nuclear Accident Response Organisation (NARO).

Critical National Infrastructure

Any industrialised society is served by a complex, highly evolved infrastructure. Although some infrastructure can be said to be ‘critical’ to that society, the majority is not. The basic condition for qualifying as critical is that the service concerned should be a monopoly or near-monopoly, or could be considered a ‘single point of failure’ in a wider critical structure. If a supply system has sufficient in-built redundancy and can offer an acceptable substitute good or service from a variety of different sources, then criticality of supply cannot be said to obtain in such circumstances. Having satisfied this first criterion, the next step to establishing criticality is to consider the effect of that infrastructure failing to provide the service expected of it. Here there are two levels of analysis. In the first place, the infrastructure concerned must contain components, structures or processes which are vulnerable to disruption, in the event of which the infrastructure as a whole might be severely degraded or even inoperable. Second, the degraded or inoperable service should have a very significant on other infrastructures, on the economy and indeed on the functioning of society as a whole.

According to the website of the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI – discussed above), the critical national infrastructure (CNI) encompasses ‘those key elements of the national infrastructure which are crucial to the continued delivery of essential services to the UK.’ The website goes on to list nine areas of economic, political and social activity in the UK which have aspects which could be considered critical:

- Communications (Department of Trade and Industry (DTI));
- Emergency Services:
  - Ambulance (Department of Health (DH));
  - Fire and Rescue (Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG));
  - Maritime/Maritime and Coastguard Agency (Department for Transport (DFT));
- Police (Home Office);
- Energy (DTI);
- Finance (HM Treasury);
- Food (Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA));

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33 The MACA framework is set out on MoD, Operations in the UK, p.1-5.
• Government (Cabinet Office);
• Health (DH);
• Transport ((DFT);
• Water (DEFRA).

In each CNI area, liaison and planning is undertaken between the lead government department concerned and the appropriate workstream co-ordinator in the Civil Contingencies Secretariat of the Cabinet Office. It is relevant to note that possibly as much as 90 per cent of the UK CNI is not government owned, and a large proportion of that is under foreign ownership.

Central Government Expenditure on Counter-Terrorism, Intelligence and Resilience

Although the precise breakdown of expenditure is difficult to establish, overall annual spending on counter-terrorism, intelligence and resilience is expected to exceed £2bn by 2008, double the rate of expenditure before 9/11. The 2004 Spending Review more than doubled UK central government’s contribution to resilience activities at the local level; a 113% increase to over £40m per annum. At the time of preparing this report (June 2007), counter-terrorism and security expenditure plans were under review as part of the 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review.35

Specific projects designed to improve resilience include the following:

• The New Dimension programme of investment in the fire and rescue services, intended to ensure that the services could respond to an incident on the scale of 9/11. The programme provides or improves on capabilities such as public mass decontamination, urban search and rescue and dealing with flooding and structural collapse. This includes improved levels of equipment for the emergency services, including 80 purpose-built vehicles for the Fire Service in England and Wales and a range of search and rescue equipment, such as radiation detectors, specialist search cameras and almost 5,000 new gas-tight suits. In all, central government has invested some £56m for mass decontamination equipment, £132m for urban search and rescue, and some £16m per annum to meet the crewing costs of New Dimension vehicles. The response to the December 2005 disaster at the Buncefield oil storage depot was considerably enhanced by the use of equipment acquired under the New Dimension programme, particularly high-volume pumps which could draw water over considerable distances, in this case from a reservoir over 2.4 kilometres from the scene of the disaster.

• The Firelink project, under a contract awarded in March 2006, will provide a National Wide Area Radio system for the Fire and Rescue Service, and will enable interoperability with the other national ‘blue light’ emergency services, although not with other external agencies. The project is scheduled to be complete in 2009.

• The Regional Fire Control (FiReControl) project, which will replace 46 non-networked fire control rooms, currently based at local fire and rescue service headquarters, with nine new Regional Control Centres (RCC). The RCC network, which will be resilient and with built-in redundancy, will improve the handling of a large-scale incident response.

• **Resilience Research.** Scientific and technical research is undertaken by the Civil Resilience Directorate (CRD), part of the Research Development Group within DCLG. Research covers IT-based contingency planning, personal protective equipment and hazard prediction. Research undertaken by the CRD also contributes to Home Office-led work on chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) resilience, such as in the production of guidance on managing the effect of CBRN incidents on buildings and infrastructure.36

**March 2007: Changes to the Machinery of Government**

On 29th March 2007 Prime Minister Tony Blair announced major changes in the UK ‘machinery of government’ which will particularly affect the central government organisation for national security and counter-terrorism. Under the new arrangements, in place from 9th May 2007, the responsibility for criminal justice and sentencing policy, as well as the National Offender Management Service (incorporating both the Prison and the Probation Services) will move from the Home Office to the Department for Constitutional Affairs, to be renamed the Ministry of Justice. The Home Office will retain its traditional responsibilities for the police service, crime reduction, immigration and asylum, and identity and passports.

From May 2007 the Home Secretary also assumed a far more prominent role in dealing with the threat of terrorism in the United Kingdom, and the capabilities of the Home Office will be strengthened to that effect. While critical areas of the counter terrorism Strategy are overseen by other Secretaries of State, notably the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, the Home Secretary has the lead responsibility for the strategy in relation to security threats in the UK, including their overseas dimension. This also means that the Home Secretary is responsible for coordinating the delivery of the strategy across Government. The Foreign Secretary continues to lead on threats from terrorism to British interests abroad. The changes announced in March are said to be aimed at producing a ‘step change’ in the UK government’s management of the terrorist threat. The changes will not alter the departmental responsibilities of the Foreign and Defence Secretaries, or other ministers. Nor, equally, will the strategic and operational reporting lines of any of the security and intelligence agencies be altered. The Cabinet Office will retain its role of supporting the Prime Minister on national security and counter-terrorism.

The changes to the machinery of government in the United Kingdom will involve the establishment of a new Ministerial Committee on Security and Terrorism, subsuming the current Defence and Overseas Policy (International Terrorism) (DOP (IT)) Committee and the counter-radicalisation aspects of the Domestic Affairs Committee’s work. The Prime Minister will chair the new committee, with the Home Secretary normally acting as deputy chair. Other ministers, such as the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, will deputise as appropriate. Meeting monthly, the new Committee will be supported by one sub-committee focusing on counter-radicalisation, which will be chaired by the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, and another sub-committee looking at domestic protective security and resilience. In order to support the Home Secretary in his new role, a new Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism has been established within the Home Office. Reporting to the Home Secretary through the new Ministerial Committee, the OSCT will take on overall responsibility for the CONTEST strategy, described above. A research and information unit will also be established ‘in support of the ongoing struggle for ideas and values to counter radicalisation.’ A press notice produced by 10 Downing Street set out tasks of the new OSCT:

All those working in the field of Counter-Terrorism, particularly our police, security and intelligence agencies, have worked unstintingly to protect the country from terrorism. Our counter-terrorism capabilities are among the best in the world. However we face a very real and growing threat which means the Government must strengthen its counter-terrorism and security capabilities, and its governance.

While critical areas of the Counter Terrorism strategy are overseen by other Secretaries of State, notably the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, the Home Secretary has the lead responsibility for the strategy in relation to security threats in the UK, including their overseas dimension.\(^{37}\)

While the threat of terrorism must be paramount in security policy-making circles in the United Kingdom, the policy framework for domestic security, resilience and civil contingencies in the United Kingdom has been developed in such a way that it could cover a broad range of emergencies, ranging from natural disaster, to infrastructure breakdown to terrorist attack. At the time of preparing this guidance paper (June 2007) it remained to be seen how (or whether) the broad spectrum civil contingencies approach would fit within the recently announced changes to the machinery of government. Perhaps in order to show that there will be a significant level of continuity with recently developed policy and practice, the Downing Street press release makes the following observation:

The changes do not alter the responsibilities of the Foreign and Defence Secretaries or the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, nor the strategic and operational reporting lines of any of our security and intelligence agencies. The Cabinet Office will retain a strong role supporting the Prime Minister on vital aspects of national security.\(^{38}\)

\(^{37}\) See [http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page11377.asp](http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page11377.asp)

\(^{38}\) See [http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page11377.asp](http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page11377.asp)
Section 4

NON-CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Regional and Devolved Resilience in the United Kingdom

The approach adopted by the UK government has been to provide central strategic direction but not to intervene directly in the management of crises. At the national strategic level, senior officials are responsible for the management and co-ordination of the functional workstreams maintained by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat. But contingency planning in London – considered to be potentially the most likely target for terrorism – and the English regions is largely delegated to Government Offices of the Regions, whose Regional Resilience Teams (RRT) co-ordinate activity at the local level in collaboration with local authorities and the emergency services. RRTs liaise with CCS workstream leaders in capability development: their respective responsibilities are formalised in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and are co-ordinated nationally by the DCLG’s Regional Co-ordination Unit, which is housed with the London Resilience Team (LRT) in the Government Office for London. Given London’s status both as the capital city and a region in its own right, the LRT acronym has latterly been replaced by LRRT – London Regional Resilience Team. Similarly, the London Resilience Forum (LRF) is now known as the LRRF. Both initiatives are discussed in more detail below.

Separate arrangements have been made for the organisation of resilience and crisis management in the devolved administrations.39

- **Regional Resilience: England.**
  A Regional Resilience Team located in each of nine regional government offices in England: North West; North East; Yorkshire and Humber; West Midlands; East Midlands; East of England; South West; South East; and London.40 In each of these regions, a Regional Resilience Forum (RRF) has been established, to bring together the main authorities and agencies, identify resilience capabilities within regions, and act as link between local and central government. As non-statutory bodies, RRFs do not have the authority to direct their members or the emergency services. RRFs do, however, play an important role in ensuring efficient and effective co-ordination among the many agencies and organisations involved in regional civil protection, as well as encouraging the development of an emergency response ethos which is multi-agency in character and which is habituated to rapid information-sharing. Each region plans its own crisis/disaster training exercises, ensuring that all agencies are involved, including the ‘front-line responders’, and that the participants are clear as to the role they would play in the event of an actual emergency. A useful illustration of the work of a Regional Resilience Team, and their plans for the future, can be found on ‘London Prepared’; the website of the London Resilience Partnership.

- **Devolved Resilience: Scotland**
  Overall responsibility for emergency preparedness in Scotland sits with the Civil Contingencies Division of the Scottish Executive Justice Department. The Scottish Executive chairs the Scottish Emergencies Co-ordinating Committee, which leads and determines the Scottish national strategy for the development of civil protection. Different departments in the Scottish Executive lead on particular issues of emergency preparedness (for example, the Scottish Executive Health Department leads on planning for the management of an outbreak of an

infectious disease\textsuperscript{41}). The Scottish Executive works closely with the UK government to ensure that Scottish needs are properly provided for. At the local level in Scotland, eight strategic co-ordinating groups based on police force areas promote effective planning and co-ordination by local responders (e.g. emergency services) for all types of incidents in their area. This includes risk assessment and planning, and exercises.

- **Devolved Resilience: Wales**
  The Welsh Assembly Government works closely with UK government departments to ensure that UK civil protection policy and planning is tailored to Welsh needs. A dedicated team in the Welsh Assembly Government supports co-operation between responders in Wales and engagement with the UK Government on issues relating to civil protection and emergency preparedness. As in England, Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) are the principle means of local multi-agency co-operation on civil protection issues. Local Resilience Forums are based on police areas. Accordingly, the respective Chief Constables presently chair LRFs in the South Wales, North Wales, Dyfed-Powys and Gwent areas. The Wales Resilience Forum provides national level advice and direction on civil protection and emergency preparedness. The forum meets quarterly and is chaired by the Welsh First Minister, with the Minister for Social Justice and Regeneration acting as Deputy Chair.

- **Devolved Resilience: Northern Ireland**
  The Central Emergency Planning Unit in the Northern Ireland Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister promotes and co-ordinates emergency preparedness. The Northern Ireland Executive would normally have oversight of civil protection arrangements for devolved functions. The Northern Ireland Office in the UK government is, however, responsible for, amongst other things, policing, criminal justice and security in Northern Ireland. During periods of suspension of the Assembly, Northern Ireland departments have been directed by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in the UK Government. Just as in the UK central government, different Northern Ireland departments take the lead on particular issues of emergency preparedness (for example, the Northern Ireland Health Department leads on planning for infectious diseases).

The Central Emergency Management Group is the national-level Northern Ireland multi-agency forum for the development, discussion and agreement of civil protection policy. It is similar to the Regional Resilience Forums in England and Wales. Co-ordination at a local level in Northern Ireland may be led by a range of organisations, with police district commanders and district council chief executives taking key roles in co-ordination. Unlike in Great Britain many services are delivered on a Northern Ireland-wide (regional) basis, either by government departments or by their agencies.

**Local Authority Emergency Planning**

- **Legislative History**

Local authorities have in the past had no statutory duty to undertake generic emergency planning. In 1986, however, the Civil Protection in Peacetime Act enabled local authorities to use and to plan to use their (Cold War) civil defence resources in connection with civil emergencies and disasters. These resources could be used to avert, alleviate or eradicate the

effects of any disaster, whatever its cause. In addition, local authorities have duties placed upon them by specific statutory instruments. These include: Regulations made to incorporate into English law European Directives dealing with hazardous materials and sites, the Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH), the Notification of Installations Handling Hazardous Substances (NIHHS), the Pipeline Safety Regulations 1996 and the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 (REPPIR). There is also a common law duty of care. A judgement at Cardiff Crown Court on 16 October 1987, relating to a flood in December 1979, found Cardiff City Council and South Glamorgan County Council negligent in their preparation and implementation of a flood emergency plan. This is the most often quoted case where the local authorities’ duty of care obligation was found wanting.

The residual duty placed on local authorities to undertake work in connection with civil defence was reinforced by the Civil Defence Grant Act 2002, which provided for central government to make a contribution towards the expense incurred by local authorities in carrying out those duties. Section 138 of the Local Government Act 1972 also allowed local authorities to take actions to avert and/or alleviate major emergencies or disasters by incurring such expenditure, and to provide loans and grants that they deem necessary to avert or alleviate the effects or potential effects of a major emergency or disaster.

- Current Organisational and Legislative Position

At the Central/Local Partnership meeting at Leeds Castle in November 2000, a review of the arrangements for emergency planning in England and Wales was announced. As part of this review, a discussion document was produced in 2001, which envisaged the introduction of new legislation covering emergency planning. Following the general election of June 2001, responsibility for emergency planning at central government level passed from the Home Office to the newly created Civil Contingencies Secretariat of the Cabinet Office, which subsequently took the lead in introducing new legislation (the Civil Contingencies Act 2004), and accompanying non-legislative measures. Taken together, these new legislative and organisational measures were intended to provide a single framework for civil protection in the United Kingdom, capable of meeting the security and safety challenges of the twenty-first century. Further information regarding the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 can be found at Annex II – Main Areas of Legislation.

London Resilience

London’s population density, concentration of critical infrastructure and national and global profile as a centre for business and tourism mean a high proportion of UK government domestic security and resilience resources – in terms of both expenditure and dedicated personnel – are concentrated in the capital. The current London Resilience arrangement arose from the findings of a post-9/11 review led by senior civil servants and members of the emergency services who found that, while the capital was generally well prepared for major incidents and catastrophes, a ‘new strategic emergency planning regime’ was necessary to meet larger scale challenges.

London Resilience is co-ordinated by the London Regional Resilience Team (LRRRT) and its oversight body, London Regional Resilience Forum (LRRF) which, although nominally a regional resilience organisation on a par with others in the eight English regions, is considerably better resourced and organised in different ways. Where Regional Resilience Forums outside London answer to the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG), the LRRF is chaired by the Minister for London (currently Nick Raynsford MP). It also remains in

42 See http://www.communities.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1123778
consultation with DCLG and the Office of the Mayor of London (currently Ken Livingstone), who serves as Deputy Chair to the LRRF. The LRRF has a number of sub-committees and working groups that concentrate on particular aspects of London’s preparedness. These include:

- Blue Lights Sub-Committee: dealing with matters related to the emergency services;
- Utilities Sub-Committee: dealing with matters affecting the key utilities such as water, gas and telecommunications;
- Business Sub-Committee: representing the general business community;
- Health Sub-Committee;
- Transport Sub-Committee;
- Communications Sub-Committee: tasked with ensuring arrangements for warning and informing the public;
- Local Authorities Sub-Committee; and
- Voluntary Sector Sub-Committee: improving the effectiveness of the voluntary sector contribution to emergency response.

The LRRF is supported by the LRRT, which grew out of the team that carried out the initial assessment of London’s preparedness. It has a small core of civil servants but most of its members are specialists seconded from partner organisations. Based within the Government Office for London, its membership currently includes the following:

- Metropolitan Police Service;
- British Transport Police;
- City of London Police;
- London Fire Brigade;
- London Ambulance Service;
- National Health Service;
- Greater London Authority;
- Corporation of the City of London, Emergency Planning Department;
- Transport for London;
- London Underground;
- British Telecom;
- London Fire & Emergency Planning Authority (LFEPA);
- Government Information and Communications Service;
- Salvation Army;

The LRRT is led by a senior civil servant with three deputy directors. Two of the deputy directors oversee a capabilities programme, while the third is responsible for developing capacity for command, control and recovery. Current capabilities being developed at LRRT include CBRN response and recovery, temporary mortuaries, rubble clearance and mass evacuation. As with the CCS workstreams programme described elsewhere in this paper, the development of capabilities in the capital involves mapping existing resources, conducting gap analysis, convening stakeholder groups, issue identification and – where necessary – the production of white papers and policy recommendations. A number of LRRT workstreams have achieved the stakeholder ratification stage, been approved at LRRF level by the Minister for London and have now become operational as pan-London protocols.
Police Forces

Within their established role of preventing, detecting and investigating crime, Police Forces in the United Kingdom have obvious responsibilities at both the local and the national level in the campaign against terrorism. Police Forces work closely with the Home Office and the devolved administrations, other law enforcement authorities, and the national security and intelligence agencies. It is for Police Forces to undertake investigations which might lead to arrests and then, in consultation with the relevant prosecution service, to decide whether to bring charges.

In London, counter-terrorism planning and operations are well-developed and are undertaken by the Specialist Operations (SO) Directorate of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), currently headed by Assistant Commissioner Andy Hayman. Within SO, the Counter-Terrorism Command (also known as SO15 – an amalgamation made in October 2006 of SO12, the MPS Special Branch, and SO13 the MPS Anti-Terrorist Branch) is headed by Deputy Assistant Commissioner Peter Clarke. Both officers also have national responsibilities: AC Hayman also chairs the Association of Chief Police Officers, Terrorism and Allied Matters Committee (ACPO [TAM]), while DAC Clarke acts as National Co-ordinator for Terrorist Investigations (NCTI).

At the national level, the MPS counter-terrorism organisation is matched by three other, regional organisations:

- Midlands Counter-Terrorist Support Unit (Midlands CTSU), covering the nine regional Midlands Police Forces;
- Greater Manchester Police Anti-Terrorist Unit (GMP ATU); and
- North-East Region Counter-Terrorist Support Unit (No. 2 Region CTSU).

There is some debate as to whether these four ‘hubs’ should or could form an embryonic national counter-terrorism force. In Scotland, the police counter-terrorism effort is co-ordinated by the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland (ACPOS) and led by an Assistant Chief Constable for Counter-Terrorism. Police Forces around the United Kingdom are supported by a network of Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers, co-ordinated by the National Counter-Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO). Other components of the UK national policing response to domestic extremism are the National Extremism Tactical Coordination Unit (NETCU), the National Coordinator for Domestic Extremism (NCDE – currently ACC Anton Setchell), the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU) and the National Domestic Extremism Team (NDET).43

Serious Organised Crime Agency

The Serious Organised Crime Unit (SOCA) was launched in April 2006. The purpose of SOCA is to bring into one agency responsibilities that were previously held by the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) and the National Crime Squad (NCS). SOCA is essentially a law enforcement organisation, reporting to the Home Secretary, with the primary purpose ‘to reduce the harm caused to the UK by serious organized crime’. With its remit to combat the trafficking of Class A drugs and organized immigration crime, SOCA will also conduct investigations in areas previously the responsibility of HM Revenue and Customs (drug trafficking and associated criminal finance) and the UK Immigration Service (organized immigration crime). SOCA’s first Annual Plan, 2006/7 sets out the organisational design and scope of operations for

43 See http://www.netcu.org.uk/enforcinglaw/nationalunits.jsp
the new agency.44

HM Revenue and Customs

HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) was formed in April 2005 with the merger of the Inland Revenue and HM Customs and Excise Departments. HMRC is tasked, inter alia, with protecting and strengthening the United Kingdom’s borders and has a duty to prevent and detect the illegal import into the UK of drugs, firearms and other harmful goods.

Home Office Border and Immigration Agency

Following a review of the Home Office Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND) in July 2006, UK immigration policy is currently undergoing reform. In the course of that process, the IND is to be transformed into ‘a more powerful agency with the operational freedoms it needs to deliver its services.’45 The new executive agency – to be known as the Border and Immigration Agency (BIA) – came into being in April 2007. The new BIA will also have regional direction and co-ordination functions.

Emergency Planning College

Based in Easingwold, Yorkshire, the UK Emergency Planning College (EPC) has a long history of training local authority emergency planners and convening emergency services and and other government agencies for collaborative exercises. It has been brought under the purview of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, and has undergone extensive redevelopment to improve living and teaching facilities. The EPC is the sponsor of a new national training scheme for emergency responders known as Project ‘Gold Standard’.46

Annex I

THE LEAD GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT SYSTEM

Default Position
Where the disaster is too wide-ranging to be handled by a single department, or where the lead is not clear from this list:

- **UK**: the Cabinet Office’s Civil Contingencies Secretariat is responsible for taking the immediate lead and then for ensuring that one department is confirmed as the lead government department. The CCS is also responsible for resolving all cases of doubt so that one department is promptly confirmed as the lead. Where the incident is threatened or caused by terrorism, the initial phase is led by the Home Office Terrorism and Protection Unit.
- **Scotland**: the Scottish Executive Justice Department (SEJD) will provide advice or lead allocation, and where appropriate will make a recommendation to Scottish Executive Ministers and the Permanent Secretary.
- **Wales**: the Emergencies and Security Division of the Welsh Assembly Government (WAG) will take the immediate lead for any matters which are devolved and in which the lead role needs to be confirmed.
- **Northern Ireland**: the Central Emergency Planning Unit (CEPU) of the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister will provide advice on lead allocation and, where appropriate, will make a recommendation to the Head of the Northern Ireland Civil Service on this.

**Terrorism: Conventional/Siege/Hostage**
- **Great Britain**: Home Office Terrorism and Protection Unit leads during the counter terrorist phase. If matters move to the stage of managing the consequences of a terrorist incident, the lead is transferred to the CCS.
- **Northern Ireland**: Northern Ireland Office.

**Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism**
- **Great Britain**: Home Office Terrorism and Protection Unit leads during the counter terrorist phase.
- **England**: If matters move to the stage of managing the consequences of a terrorist CBRN incident, the lead is transferred to the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs;
- **Scotland**: Consequence management for devolved functions following terrorism within Scotland would fall to the Scottish Executive and its own lead department arrangements.
- **Wales**: Consequence management for devolved functions following terrorism within Wales would fall to the WAG and its own lead department arrangements.
- **Northern Ireland**: Consequence management for devolved functions following terrorism within Northern Ireland would fall to the Northern Ireland Office and its own lead department arrangements.

**Civil Defence**
- **UK**: Cabinet Office, CCS working closely with the Overseas Defence Secretariat.
Flooding (Coastal or Riverine)
- England: DEFRA;
- Scotland: Scottish Executive Environment and Rural Affairs Department (SEERAD);
- Wales: Department for Environment, Planning and Countryside of the Welsh Assembly Government;
- Northern Ireland: Department of Agriculture and Rural Development.

Marine and Coastal Pollution (Oil, Chemical or Gas) and Marine Salvage
- Pollution from vessels and offshore installations:
  - UK: Counter Pollution Branch of Department for Transport’s (DfT) Maritime & Coastguard Agency (MCA).
  - Scotland: as for UK but with SEERAD involvement.
- Pollution from land:
  - England: DEFRA working with the Environment Agency.
  - Scotland: SEERAD
  - Wales: Department for Environment, Planning and Countryside of the WAG working with DEFRA and the Environment Agency.
  - Northern Ireland: Department of the Environment
- Salvage of shipping casualties:
  - UK: Secretary of State’s Representative for Salvage and Intervention (DfT’s Maritime and Coastguard Agency)

Radiation Hazards
UK: the UK’s Radioactive Incident Monitoring Network (RIMNET); operated and managed by DEFRA supports all UK radiological emergencies.
- If incident is initiated or threatened by terrorism:
  - GB: Home Office Terrorism and Protection Unit. If matters move to the stage of managing the consequences of an incident, the lead will transfer as indicated below.
  - Northern Ireland: Northern Ireland Office.
- Civil nuclear installations:
  - Scotland: Scottish Executive Transport, Enterprise & Lifelong Learning Department (SEETLLD).
  - Northern Ireland: Department of the Environment.
- Defence nuclear installations and defence nuclear material in transit:
  - UK: Ministry of Defence (MoD).
  - Scotland: as for UK but SEJD-EP would co-ordinate consequence management issues within the Scottish Executive.
  - Wales: as for UK but Emergencies and Security Division would co-ordinate consequence management issues within the WAG.
  - Northern Ireland: as for UK, but lead for consequence management would be Department of the Environment.
- Accidental release of radiation from civil nuclear material in transit:
  - England: DfT.
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) Incidents arising from Non-Terrorist Causes

- England: CCS would ensure that, dependent on the cause of the incident, a lead department was identified for the emergency phase. If matters moved to the stage of managing the consequences, the lead would pass to DEFRA.
- Scotland: the appropriate SE lead department for the outcome of the event would lead on consequence management.
- Wales: the appropriate WAG department for the outcome of the event would lead on consequence management.
- Northern Ireland: the appropriate lead NI department for the outcome of the event would lead on consequence management.

Radiation Hazards (Arising Outside the United Kingdom)

- UK: Foreign and Commonwealth Office will lead on relations with overseas government(s).

Where hazard arises as a result of terrorist action overseas:
- UK: Home Office TPU to lead in considering potential threat to UK of a co-ordinated attack against UK targets.

As a result of accidents:
- England and Wales: DEFRA working with the Environment Agency.
- Scotland: SEERAD EPU and Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA).
- Northern Ireland: Department of the Environment.

Satellite Incidents

- UK: CCS is responsible for ensuring a lead department takes responsibility for managing consequences once these become clear. Planning will be based on CCS assessments worked up in close consultation with the British National Space Centre of the DTI.

Emergencies on Offshore Installations

- UK: Health and Safety Executive (in DfT).

Disaster Overseas (in which UK assistance is sought)

- UK: Department for International Development (DFID).

Search and Rescue

Civil maritime and coastal rescue:
- DfT’s MCA.

Military shipping and aircraft, civil aircraft at sea and civil aircraft on land when the location is not known (when the location is known the emergency is treated as a transport accident - see below):
- MoD.
**Severe Storms and Weather**

- England: CCS is responsible for ensuring which department takes the lead in good time to support the response to severe storms and weather.

If primary impact is on the transport infrastructure:
- England: DfT.
- Scotland: Scottish Executive Development Department (SEDD).
- Wales: Department for Economic Development and Transport of the WAG.
- Northern Ireland: Department for Regional Development.

If the primary impact is on the power system:
- England and Wales: DTI.
- Scotland: SELLD.
- Northern Ireland: Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment.

If the severe weather’s primary effect is flooding:
- England: DEFRA.
- Scotland: SEERAD.
- Wales: Department for Environment, Planning and Countryside of the WAG.
- Northern Ireland: Department of Agriculture and Rural Development, or Department for Regional Development, depending on the source of flooding.

**Transport Incidents** (including those overseas involving UK registered ships and aircraft)

Shipping and air transport:
- UK: DfT Marine Accident Investigation Branch and Air Accident Investigation Branch.
- Scotland: as for UK, for shipping, air transport and land based but with SEETLLDD involved where the issue is devolved.

Land transport:
- England: DfT and the HSE.
- Wales: Department for Economic Development and Transport of the WAG.
- Northern Ireland: Department for Regional Development.

**Disasters in Sports Grounds (whether sporting or non-sporting events)**
- England: Department for Culture, Media and Sport.
- Scotland: SEJD.
- Wales: Local Government and Culture Department of the WAG.
- Northern Ireland: Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure.

**Major Explosions Arising from Landfill Gas**
- England: DEFRA working with the Environment Agency.
- Scotland: SEERAD.
- Wales: Department for Environment, Planning and Countryside of the WAG.
- Northern Ireland: Department of the Environment.

**Dam Failures**
- England: DEFRA.
- Scotland: SEERAD.
- Wales: Department for Environment, Planning and Countryside of the WAG.
• Northern Ireland: Department for Regional Development.

**Earthquakes**
• England and Wales: Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG).
• Scotland: SEJD lead, depending on which department’s interests were most affected.
• Northern Ireland: Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment.

**Major Structural Failures in Buildings** (other than those caused by external impact, gas explosion, fire or industrial process)
• England: DCLG.
• Scotland: lead Scottish Executive department would depend on the outcome of the event.
• Wales: lead WAG department would depend on the outcome of the event.
• Northern Ireland: lead NI department would depend on the outcome of the event.

**Serious Industrial Incidents**
• England: the CCS is responsible for confirming the Lead Government Department in good time to support the response to an industrial accident.
• Scotland: SEJD.
• Wales: the Emergencies and Security Division of the WAG will determine the lead if the main focus of attention is a devolved matter.
• Northern Ireland: lead NI department would depend on the nature and outcome of the event.

If rivers, inland waterways (outside Port Authority jurisdiction) or water services are the main cause of concern, or gas clouds of unknown origin are threatening the environment or public safety:
• England: DEFRA working with the Environment Agency.
• Scotland: SEERAD.
• Wales: Department for Environment, Planning and Countryside of the WAG.

If the main focus of attention relates to the operations of the HSE:
• England and Wales: Department for Work and Pensions working with HSE.
• Scotland: SEETLLD.
• Northern Ireland: Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment, working with HSE, NI.

Pollution arising:
• England: DEFRA (see also Radiation Hazards).
• Scotland: SEERAD.
• Wales: Department for Environment, Planning and Countryside of the WAG.
• Northern Ireland: Department of the Environment.

**Unexploded Wartime Ordnance**

Disposal:
• UK: Police calling on MoD support.

Information on whereabouts of unexploded bombs:
• UK: DCLG.
Major Software Failures
- UK: CCS.
- Scotland: SE Finance and Central Services Department (SEFCSD).
- Wales: Emergencies and Security Division (PMBSG) of the WAG.
- Northern Ireland: Department of Finance and Personnel.

Electronic Attack
- UK: Home Office/CPNI.
- Scotland: SEFCSD and Central Services Department will co-ordinate activity in their areas in support of the UK effort where there is a Scottish dimension.
- Wales: PMBSG of the WAG will co-ordinate activity in their areas in support of the UK effort where there is a Welsh dimension.
- Northern Ireland: Department of Finance and Personnel will co-ordinate activity in their areas in support of the UK effort where there is a Northern Ireland dimension.

Disruption of Supply Chains
- UK:
  - Medical - Department of Health (DoH);
  - Food, water, waste – DEFRA working with the Environment Agency;
  - Fuel, energy, electronic communication networks, postal services and manufacturing industry – DTI;
  - Transport – DfT;
  - Finance – HM Treasury.
- Scotland: the appropriate SE department depending on the outcome of the disruption:
  - Medical: SEHD (Scottish Executive Health Department);
  - Food, water, waste: SEERAD (Scottish Executive Environment and Rural Affairs Department);
  - Manufacturing, oil, gas and electricity – SEETLLD (Scottish Executive Transport, Enterprise and Lifelong Learning Department);
- Wales:
  - Health - NHS (Wales);
  - Food, water, waste - Department of Environment, Planning and Countryside;
- Northern Ireland: the appropriate NI department depending on the outcome of the disruption.

Animal Disease and Welfare
- UK: (EU & international aspects).
- GB: co-ordination of disease control policy and veterinary advice.
- England: domestic policy and operational – DEFRA/State Veterinary Service (with DoH/Food Standards Agency (FSA) if threat to human health (zoonosis)).
- Scotland: Domestic policy and operational with SEERAD in association with DEFRA SVS (State Veterinary Service).
- Wales: Domestic policy and operational – joint DEFRA/SVS and Agriculture & Rural Affairs Department of the WAG.
- Northern Ireland: Domestic policy and operational with DARD.

Food Contamination
- England: FSA.
- Scotland: FSA in Scotland.
• Wales: FSA in Wales.
• Northern Ireland: FSA in NI.

Drinking Water Contamination
• England: DEFRA.
• Scotland: SEERAD.
• Wales: Department of Environment, Planning and Countryside of the WAG.
• Northern Ireland: Department for Regional Development.

Infectious Diseases
• England: DoH with assistance from the Health Protection Agency (HPA).
• Scotland: SEHD.
• Wales: Office of the CMO with the assistance of the Public Health Laboratories Service.
• Northern Ireland: Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety.